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(Mis)understanding the Cossack Icon 
 
On 5 November 1708, the terrified inhabitants of the Ukrainian town of Hlukhiv witnessed a 
shocking ritual. An effigy of their hetman, Ivan Mazepa, who together with his associates had 
recently defected from Tsar Peter I and joined the advancing army of Charles XII of Sweden, 
was dragged through the streets of the town. At a freshly built scaffold, Aleksandr Menshikov, 
the tsar’s right-hand man, read out a list of Mazepa’s crimes and tore the sash of the Order of St. 
Andrew from the effigy. These events gave the inhabitants of the Hetmanate—the autonomous 
Cossack polity in the Tsardom of Muscovy (later the Russian Empire)—their last public 
opportunity to see an image of their elderly hetman. His capital, Baturyn, and his palace were 
burned, his name was anathematized in all the churches of the empire, and his portraits were 
banned and destroyed. The same fate befell icons in which Mazepa was depicted as a donor to 
the numerous churches that he helped build or restore.
1 
  Almost thirty years after the Hlukhiv ritual, in 1737, the mere suspicion that Mazepa had 
been depicted in an icon of the Dormition prompted a major investigation in the Hetmanate. It 
was alleged that the icon included portraits of Hetman Mazepa, his successor, Ivan Skoropadsky, 
and Acting Hetman Pavlo Polubotok. Members of the Cossack general staff who had served 
under the three hetmans testified that none of the images resembled the above-mentioned 
                                                             
1 On the anathematization of Mazepa and the ritual performed on his effigy on the orders of Aleksandr 
Menshikov, see Orest Subtelny, The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century 
(Boulder, Colo., 1981), 39-40. Cf. Oleksandr Rigel'man, Litopysna opovid' pro Malu Rosiiu ta ïï narod i 
kozakiv uzahali (reprint of the 1847 edition of Letopisnoe povestvovanie o Maloi Rossii, Kyiv, 1994), 547.   2 
individuals. They described Mazepa as a carrot-haired man with a longish face and a beard.
2 The 
seriousness of the investigation and the summoning of high-ranking Cossack officers as 
witnesses attest to the fact that icons bearing Mazepa’s image and portraits of him were 
systematically hunted down in Ukraine and destroyed long after Mazepa’s actual defection, the 
end of the Northern War with Sweden, and the death of Emperor Peter himself. What helped 
sustain Mazepa’s bad reputation was the anathema proclaimed annually on the first Sunday of 
Great Lent in the churches of the empire.
3 
Despite the continuing efforts of the imperial secular and church authorities to discredit 
Mazepa and, more particularly, the idea of the separation of Ukraine from Russia, of which he 
became a primary symbol, he turned into one of the most emblematic figures of European 
romanticism. Voltaire, Byron, Ryleev, Pushkin, and Słowacki wrote about him, while Liszt and 
Tchaikovsky, among others, dedicated musical compositions to him.
4 His upbringing at the court 
of the Polish king, his capture by the Cossacks and stunning rise to the pinnacle of Cossackdom, 
his romantic involvement with a younger woman, his flight from the tsar, his death in exile and, 
finally, his anathematization by the church—all these subjects proved irresistible to romantic 
authors. Mazepa’s popularity abroad could not but inspire interest in him among the young 
                                                             
2 For a discussion of the incident, see D. Sapozhnikov, ‘Zagadochnye portrety,’ Kievskaia starina, 1884, 
no. 9: 732-42. Cf. Pavlo Zholtovs'kyi, Ukraïns'kyi zhyvopys XVII-XVIII st. (Kyiv, 1978), 225. 
3 See Subtelny, The Mazepists, 1. On the anathematization of Mazepa, see Giovanna Brogi, ‘Mazepa, lo zar 
e il diavolo. Un inedito di Stefan Javorskij,’ Russica Romana 7 (2000): 167-88. A church service 
commemorating the victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Poltava also featured a condemnation of 
Mazepa, who was identified with Judas. See Elena Pogosian, Petr I—arkhitektor rossiiskoi istorii (St. 
Petersburg, 2001), 177.  
4 See Hubert F. Babinski, The Mazeppa Legend in European Romanticism (New York, 1974).   3 
Ukrainian national awakeners, for whom he was not only the ultimate romantic hero but also a 
symbol of resistance to the Russian Empire on behalf of their beloved Ukraine.  
Among those who showed more than a benign interest in the person of Mazepa was the 
young Ukrainian painter and poet Taras Shevchenko, a member of the first clandestine Ukrainian 
political organization who was to become known as the ‘father’ of modern Ukraine. As a student 
at the Academy of Fine Arts in St. Petersburg, he became interested in Mazepa and searched 
among the paintings stored in the academy’s attic for a portrait of the famous hetman. What he 
found was a depiction of a Cossack officer with unkempt hair and an unbuttoned coat, often 
thought in the nineteenth century to be a portrait of Mazepa.
5 While the painting was highly 
reminiscent of the romantic image of Mazepa as portrayed by Byron and Pushkin, it had nothing 
to do with his actual appearance. Shevchenko used some elements of it as a model for his portrait 
of another Cossack enemy of Peter, Acting Hetman Pavlo Polubotok. The latter died in a tsarist 
prison after appealing to Peter to restore Cossack liberties: unlike the ‘accursed’ Mazepa, 
Polubotok was accorded a measure of toleration by the Russian imperial authorities as a symbol 
of Ukrainian aspirations, apparently because he did not take up arms against the monarch.
6 
                                                             
5 The picture, originally known as a portrait of a ‘Little Russian,’ was later retitled ‘Field Hetman.’ The 
new name (napol'nyi getman in Russian) derived from a misunderstanding of the catalogue description of 
the picture, which stated that it was a not fully (napolno in eighteenth-century Russian) completed portrait 
of a hetman. Later it was taken to be a portrait of Mazepa. See Platon Bilets'kyi, Ukraïns'kyi portretnyi 
zhyvopys XVII-XVII st. Problemy stanovlennia i rozvytku (Kyiv, 1969), 124.  
6 As in the case of Mazepa, the portraits of Polubotok that circulated in Ukraine during the nineteenth 
century had nothing to do with the true image of the acting hetman. In real life, he was rather stocky and 
did not fit the requirements of a romantic hero. As a result, portraits of his father, Leontii, which fit those 
requirements much better, were disseminated as portraits of Pavlo Polubotok, popularizing the idea of 
Ukraine’s struggle for its autonomous rights (ibid., 124, 219-21).   4 
        In the conflict between Peter and Mazepa, Shevchenko’s sympathies were unquestionably 
on the side of the former. In the poem ‘Irzhavets'’ (1847), written after his arrest and exile on 
political charges, Shevchenko called the emperor a ‘hangman’ (kat) and regretted that the 
Cossacks of the Hetmanate had not emulated the Zaporozhians in giving unanimous support to 
their hetman, Mazepa, in his struggle with Peter at Poltava.
7 During the years preceding his 
arrest, Shevchenko lived for a while in Pereiaslav, one of the centres of the former Hetmanate. 
There he painted pictures of local architectural monuments, including the local Church of the 
Holy Protection (Pokrova) of the Theotokos.
8 He also had the opportunity to study the large 
painting of the Pokrova in the church, whose iconographic composition was drawn from the Life 
of St. Andrew the Holy Fool. Figuring prominently in that vita was the story of the appearance of 
the Mother of God in the Byzantine church of Blachernai to protect the people of Constantinople 
from a barbarian siege. Judging by the names of newly consecrated churches, the Feast of the 
Pokrova became popular in Ukraine during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
The iconography of the Pokrova developed in Ukraine under strong Western influence, allowing 
painters to depict the Mother of God and the saints along with images of tsars and tsarinas, which 
replaced depictions of Byzantine emperors and empresses, as well as images of the Cossack 
officers who sponsored the icons.
9 One such Cossack icon was the Pereiaslav Pokrova, which 
was transferred from wood to canvas. It showed Tsar Peter I, Catherine I, representatives of the 
                                                             
7 See the English translation of the poem ‘Irzhavets'’ in The Poetical Works of Taras Shevchenko: The 
Kobzar, trans. C. H. Andrusyshen and Watson Kirkconnell (Toronto, 1977), 325-28, here 325-26.  
8 For a reproduction of the 1845 water colour, see Shevchenkivs'kyi slovnyk, 2: 323-33 (Kyiv, 1977). 
9 For a comprehensive discussion of the origins of the iconographic composition of the Pokrova, see 
Mieczysław Gębarowicz, Mater Misericordiae—Pokrow—Pokrowa w sztuce i legendzie Środkowo-
Wschodniej Europy (Wrocław, 1986).   5 
Orthodox clergy, and a number of Cossack officers, their wives and relatives under the 
protection of the veil (pokrov) of the Theotokos. [See illustration. Source: Igor' Grabar', 
Istoriia russkogo iskusstva, vol. 6 (Moscow, 1914), p. 475.] 
  Shevchenko was clearly impressed by the icon: years later, he included a description of it 
in his Russian-language novel The Twins (1855). One of the main characters, Nikifor Sokira, a 
descendant of an old Cossack family who embodies Ukrainian patriotic traditions, is presented 
there as a great admirer of that particular icon. Shevchenko described the church and the painting 
itself as follows: ‘The Church of the Pokrova, clumsy and nondescript in construction, was built 
in honor of Peter I’s conquest of Azov by Colonel Myrovych of Pereiaslav, a friend and 
contemporary of the anathematized Mazepa. Preserved in that church is a remarkable historical 
painting, perhaps a work of Matveev, if not of some foreigner. The painting is divided into two 
parts: above, the Protection of the Most Holy Mother of God; below, Peter I with Empress 
Catherine I; and around them, all his eminent associates. They included Hetman Mazepa and the 
founder of the shrine in all his regalia.’
10 
   Shevchenko was correct in his identification of the portraits of Peter and Catherine, but 
his belief that the icon included a portrait of Mazepa was a mere figment of his imagination. The 
very fact that the icon included a portrait of Peter together with Catherine suggests that it could 
not have been painted before the announcement of their wedding in 1712. By that time, Mazepa 
had already been anathematized, and a depiction of the victorious tsar and his ‘betrayer’ in the 
same icon would have been simply impossible. As the investigation of 1737 indicates, even if 
such an icon had been painted, it would not have survived until Shevchenko’s times.  
Still, if Mazepa is not depicted in the icon, who is? There is good reason to believe that 
                                                             
10 Shevchenko, ‘Bliznetsy,’ in idem, Povne zibrannia tvoriv, 4: 26-27 (Kyiv, 1964).   6 
the Pereiaslav icon was commissioned by members of the Sulyma family, which gave Ukraine a 
number of prominent Cossack officers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
Pereiaslav icon closely resembles the Pokrova icon from the village of Sulymivka commissioned 
by Semen Sulyma, who was colonel of Pereiaslav from 1739 to 1766. It was either he or his 
father, Ivan, the acting colonel of Pereiaslav during the reign of Peter I, who most probably 
commissioned the Pereiaslav icon, so reminiscent of the Pokrova icon displayed at their estate in 
Sulymivka. What we now know about the Sulymas and the general atmosphere in the Hetmanate 
after 1712 indicates that the Pereiaslav icon manifested the loyalty of the Cossack officer stratum 
to the tsar, not the notion of rebellion against him symbolized by the image of Mazepa.
11   
  Clearly, that is not how Shevchenko saw the icon and understood its historical and 
political message. After all, his Nikifor Sokira willed that the icon be placed at the head of his 
coffin at his funeral—not, of course, for its portrait of the imperial couple but because of the 
images of the Cossack officers. For Shevchenko and his contemporaries in the ranks of 
Ukrainian national awakeners, those images, especially that of Mazepa, symbolized the glorious 
Cossack past, which was emerging as a cornerstone of modern Ukrainian historical memory and 
identity.
12 Shevchenko’s identification of one of the personages in the Pereiaslav Pokrova icon as 
Hetman Mazepa had a lasting effect on the study of the Cossack Pokrova in general and the 
Pereiaslav icon in particular. 
                                                             
11 For a discussion of the circumstances in which the icon was painted and its ideological message, see my 
Tsars and Cossacks: A Study in Iconography (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), 55-62. Cf. the reproduction of the 
Sulymivka Pokrova, ibid., plate XI. 
12 On the importance of the Cossack myth for the Ukrainian nation-building project, see John A. 
Armstrong, ‘Myth and History in the Evolution of Ukrainian Consciousness,’ in Ukraine and Russia in 
 Their Historical Encounter, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton, 1992), 125B39.   7 
  As the Cossack mythology gained a stronger hold on the imagination of adherents of the 
Ukrainian national movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so did the 
images of its hetmans. One of the main developments in the field was the de facto rehabilitation 
of Mazepa by the leaders of the national movement. Under new circumstances, he replaced 
Polubotok as a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle for autonomy and independence. Numerous real 
and alleged portraits of Mazepa were included in the surveys of Ukrainian history that began to 
appear in the Russian Empire in the first decade of the twentieth century. The most popular of 
them was Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s Illustrated History of Ukraine,
13 which included seven 
different portraits of Mazepa. 
   An important role in the conceptualization of early modern Ukrainian icon painting was 
played by Evgenii Kuzmin’s essay on ‘Ukrainian Painting of the Seventeenth Century,’ which 
appeared on the eve of World War I as part of the sixth volume of Igor Grabar’s History of 
Russian Art.
14 Kuzmin suggested that Ukrainian art of the second half of the seventeenth century 
had been shaped by the rise of national identity, owing to the influence of Metropolitan Peter 
Mohyla and, as Kuzmin put it, ‘the definitive unification of Ukraine with Moscow under Bohdan 
Khmelnytsky.’ In his opinion, the latter development ‘promoted the vindication of all that was 
characteristically Orthodox, i.e., Byzantine-Russian, as a counterweight to Polish Latinization.’
15 
Kuzmin maintained that the defining feature of Ukrainian art in the first decades of the 
                                                             
13 See Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, Iliustrovana istoriia Ukraïny (Kyiv, 1912). The book appeared in numerous 
editions in Ukraine between 1912 and 1918 and was later repeatedly reprinted in the West. 
14 Despite its title, the essay also covered Ukrainian painting of the eighteenth century. See Evgenii 
Kuz'min, ‘Ukrainskaia zhivopis' XVII veka’ in Igor' Grabar', Istoriia russkago iskusstva, vol. 6 (=Istoriia 
zhivopisi, vol. 1, Dopetrovskaia ėpokha) (Moscow, 1914), 455-80. 
15 Ibid., 458-59.   8 
eighteenth century was the growing impact of West European art forms—a process associated 
with Hetman Mazepa. Although the hetman figured as a ‘scoundrel’ (getman-zlodei) in 
Kuzmin’s text, the author used quotation marks to dissociate himself from that characterization. 
Kuzmin stressed the impact of Mazepa’s activities on Ukrainian art, comparing it with that of 
Metropolitan Mohyla. He associated another important development in art, the advance of 
secularism at the expense of religion, with the transforming activity of Peter. Those were the 
elements that Kuzmin discerned in the Pokrova icon from Pereiaslav, which was reproduced in 
the volume. He claimed that the secularism of the new era was reflected in the centrality of the 
figure of Peter in the icon, while the advance of Western influence was apparent in its style.
16   
   The study of Cossack icon painting in the former Russian Empire was halted by the 
events of World War I and the Revolution. The rise of militant atheism in the USSR and the 
intensification of government attacks on the cultural intelligentsia further hindered research on 
the subject. In Ukraine, the situation was exacerbated by the incessant official search for 
manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism in art and scholarship, with Mazepa serving as the 
embodiment of ‘Ukrainian separatism.’ Thus a revival of the study of Cossack icon painting in 
Ukraine became possible only in the 1950s, and then only within the context of research on the 
                                                             
16 Kuzmin’s high opinion of Mazepa’s role in the development of Ukrainian art was apparently influenced 
by Hrushevsky’s treatment of the hetman. In his essay, Kuzmin made reference to one of the Cossack-era 
portraits in Hrushevsky’s survey (ibid., 462, 170-76). In turn, Kuzmin’s essay influenced quite a few 
Ukrainian scholars, including Mykola Holubets, the author of a survey of Ukrainian art (1922). There, 
Holubets repeated almost verbatim some of Kuzmin’s basic assessments. He noted the influence on 
Ukrainian art of ‘Ukraine’s unification with Russia’ and the profound impact of Ivan Mazepa’s activities on 
the Westernization of Ukrainian art forms. See Mykola Holubets', Nacherk istoriï ukraïns'koho mystetstva 
(Lviv, 1922; repr. New York, 1973), 234, 240-41.    9 
liberation struggle of the popular masses and the paradigm of the ‘reunification’ of Ukraine with 
Russia. It was in these terms that the Ukrainian art historian Pavlo Zholtovsky, freshly released 
from the GULAG, attempted to rehabilitate Cossack painting of the period in his study of early 
modern Ukrainian art (1958). In it Zholtovsky defined the ideological significance of the 
Cossack Pokrova icons (including the one from Pereiaslav) as follows: ‘The Cossack Pokrovas, 
uniting religious and historical subjects, were a specific affirmation in church painting of the idea 
of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia.’
17 Thus Kuzmin’s and, later, Holubets’s 
interpretation of the conditions that influenced the development of Ukrainian art in the second 
half of the seventeenth century were transferred by Zholtovsky to the era of Ivan Mazepa and 
treated not as a cultural but a political phenomenon. Ironically, if one ignores the official 
‘reunification’ terminology imposed on Zholtovsky, he was not too far off the mark, as the icons 
indeed reflected the nature of Russo-Ukrainian relations of the period. 
  Fedir Umantsev, the author of the section on early modern Ukrainian painting in the 
collective volume Essays on the History of Ukrainian Art (1966), also regarded the Cossack 
Pokrovas as manifestations of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia and the unity of ‘two 
fraternal peoples.’ The editors of the volume published a black-and-white reproduction of the 
Pereiaslav icon, a colour image of a Pokrova icon that included a portrait of Bohdan 
Khmelnytsky, and a detail of the Sulymivka icon—the most representative collection of 
reproductions of the Cossack Pokrovas at the time. In discussing the Pereiaslav icon, Umantsev 
claimed that, along with the image of Peter I, it included portraits of Catherine II (an obvious 
confusion with Catherine I) and the architect of Peter’s church reform, Teofan Prokopovych. He 
                                                             
17 See Pavlo Zholtovs'kyi, Vyzvol'na viina ukraïns'koho narodu v pam’iatkakh mystetstva XVI-XVIII st. 
(Kyiv, 1958), 53-54.   10 
also claimed that the icon had been commissioned by the builder of the church, a certain 
Nemyrych, confusing the name of the famous seventeenth-century Cossack general chancellor 
with that of the eighteenth-century colonel of Pereiaslav, Ivan Myrovych.
18  
  The late 1960s witnessed a revival of interest in early modern Ukrainian icon painting, 
which prompted numerous publications and republications of the Pokrova icons. Most 
prominently featured was the icon with the portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, while the Pereiaslav 
icon was reproduced only once, in the above-mentioned one-volume history of Ukrainian art. 
There are several reasons why the Khmelnytsky icon not only overshadowed but completely 
eliminated the Pereiaslav Pokrova from histories of Ukrainian art. First of all, the Pereiaslav icon 
itself was destroyed in World War II, leaving scholars and publishers with a mere copy. Second, 
although Peter I, whose portrait appeared in the icon, was regarded as a progressive figure in the 
1960s, he was no match for the leader of a popular uprising, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 
especially when it came to representing the idea of Russo-Ukrainian friendship—a key concept 
in post-World War II Soviet historiography. And last but not least, the Pereiaslav icon was 
blemished by its association with the name of Ivan Mazepa, the antihero of the historiographic 
myth of the ‘friendship of peoples.’ Shevchenko’s identification of one of the Cossacks in the 
icon as Hetman Mazepa, whom Soviet ideological watchdogs proclaimed a traitor to the 
Ukrainian people, was not forgotten. Shevchenko’s works were reissued in large print runs 
throughout the Soviet period, and some Soviet scholars, such as Hryhorii Lohvyn, continued to 
list Mazepa among the historical figures depicted in the Pereiaslav icon.
19 
  At the end of the 1960s, Platon Biletsky published his groundbreaking study of the early 
                                                             
18 See Narysy z istoriï ukraïns'koho mystetstva (Kyiv, 1966), 94-95, plate VI, illustrations nos. 159, 160.  
19 See Hryhorii Lohvyn, Po Ukraïni. Starodavni mystets'ki pam’iatky (Kyiv, 1968), 71.   11 
modern Ukrainian portrait, in which he did not associate the flourishing of Ukrainian art in Left-
Bank Ukraine (a Soviet euphemism for the Hetmanate) with the consequences of the Pereiaslav 
Council of 1654, which, according to the Soviet historical imagination, proclaimed the 
‘reunification of Ukraine with Russia,’ or with the friendship of the two fraternal peoples. 
Rather, Biletsky saw it as a consequence of Khmelnytsky’s ‘wars of liberation’ and of the 
economic independence of the Cossack polity.
20 From that statement, it was only one step to the 
assertion that the Ukrainian state had been independent under Khmelnytsky—a notion regarded 
by the Soviet watchdogs as the ultimate manifestation of ‘Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.’ 
Biletsky, for his part, made use of the Soviet paradigm of class struggle to assert his national 
agenda. In the tradition of Ukrainian populist historiography of the pre-revolutionary era, he 
attacked the representatives of the Cossack officer stratum, such as the Sulymas, claiming that 
they had ‘rejected’ their glorious Cossack ancestors and invented a foreign ancestry to prove 
their noble status. Although Biletsky did not write specifically about the Cossack Pokrovas, his 
attitude to the likely commissioners of the Pereiaslav and Sulymivka icons leaves no doubt that 
he did not approve of their servility toward the Russian tsars.
 21 
  In his book of 1981 on early modern Ukrainian art, Biletsky elaborated his critique of the 
social egoism of the Cossack officer stratum, which betrayed the interests of the people (and, one 
should understand, the nation as well) in its pursuit of the privileges and estates granted by the 
                                                             
20 See Bilets'kyi, Ukraïns'kyi portretnyi zhyvopys, 82. 
21 Ibid., 191-92. Biletsky’s critique of the social egoism of the Cossack officer stratum was directly applied 
to the sponsors of the Pokrova icons by Zholtovsky, who wrote: ‘The “Cossack Pokrovas” present a 
profoundly conceived image of the contemporary Hetmanate, its elite, the colonels, captains, and Cossack 
officers, who based themselves on the power of the tsarist Russian regime and gradually entered the ranks 
of the “well-born nobiliary stratum” (Zholtovs'kyi, Ukraïns'kyi zhyvopys XVII-XVIII st., 231-34).   12 
Russian government. In a decade of government-sponsored hunting for manifestations of 
Ukrainian nationalism and ‘idealization’ of Cossackdom, which cost the first secretary of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine, Petro Shelest, his career, Biletsky could not write as he had in the 
late 1960s about the economic independence of Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s state as the basis for the 
flourishing of Ukrainian art. At most, he could limit the number of obligatory references to the 
impact of the ‘historical act of the reunification of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples’ on art and 
continue his class-based critique of the pro-Russian elites of the Hetmanate.
22 In his new book, 
Biletsky briefly discussed the Pereiaslav and Sulymivka icons, noting the Russian roots of their 
composition. He also quoted from Shevchenko’s description of the Pereiaslav Pokrova but failed 
to mention Mazepa among the figures possibly depicted in it.
23  
  While Ukrainian art historians under Soviet rule struggled with state-imposed limitations 
on what they could say in their works, their few counterparts in the ranks of the Ukrainian 
diaspora in the West sought to ignore the Russian aspect of the Cossack Pokrovas altogether, 
focusing on the genre of Cossack Pokrovas as an expression of Ukrainian art. What resonated 
very strongly among historians of Ukrainian art in the West (all of them recent émigrés from 
Ukraine) was the interpretation of Ukrainian art of the first half of the eighteenth century as a 
phenomenon closely associated with the activities of Hetman Mazepa. If in Soviet Ukraine 
association with Mazepa could relegate a particular work of art to decades of obscurity and 
neglect, in the diaspora this association had the opposite effect, since Mazepa emerged there as a 
                                                             
22 See Platon Bilets'kyi, Ukraïns'ke mystetstvo druhoï polovyny XVII-XVIII stolit' (Kyiv, 1981), 6-7, 98, 
100. 
23 Although he stayed away from the ‘Mazepa problem,’ Biletsky questioned Shevchenko’s suggestion that 
the author of the icon was a foreigner, noting that an artist of such qualifications could have been trained in 
the Kyivan Cave Monastery as easily as in the West (ibid., 36-37).   13 
forerunner of Ukrainian independence. It was through this prism that the architecture, painting 
and engraving of the era were interpreted in Volodymyr Sichynsky’s book on Mazepa as a 
patron of the arts.
24 The same approach was taken by the historian of the Ukrainian icon (and an 
active icon painter himself), Sviatoslav Hordynsky. In his popular book on the history of the 
Ukrainian icon, published in 1973, Hordynsky noted the wealth of Pokrova iconography in 
Cossack Ukraine and associated it with the development of portrait painting during the Cossack 
era. Like other diaspora scholars, he preferred not to focus on the political and ideological 
message conveyed by the Cossack Pokrovas.
25  
  The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the rise of independent Ukraine resulted in the 
lifting of ideological controls on publications dealing with the history of Ukrainian art. The 
collapse of state-sponsored atheism and the religious revival on the one hand and growing 
interest in the history of Ukrainian culture, with icon painting as one of its components, on the 
other resulted in the publication of an impressive number of books and illustrated collections on 
the history of the Ukrainian icon. The 1990s saw an avalanche of publications that included 
reproductions or discussions of the Cossack Pokrovas. When it comes to quantity of 
reproductions, the Pokrova with the portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytsky remained in the lead, with 
the Pereiaslav Pokrova as sorely neglected as before 1991—this time, apparently, not because of 
the alleged association with Mazepa but because of the portrait of Peter I, whose empire-building 
efforts find little admiration among Ukrainian scholars. Given that the original icon did not 
survive, it has been easy for contemporary Ukrainian scholars to avoid including it in their 
                                                             
24 See Volodymyr Sichyns'kyi, Ivan Mazepa. Liudyna i metsenat (Philadelphia, 1951). 
25 See Sviatoslav Hordyns'kyi, Ukraïns'ka ikona XII-XVIII storich (Philadelphia, 1973), 22-23.   14 
illustrated collections.
26 
  Contemporary Ukrainian writing dealing with Cossack iconography presents a curious 
mix of old and new approaches to the subject. Some scholars remain attached in one way or 
another to their Soviet-era stereotypes, while others are prepared to pull out all the stops in 
attempting to complete the nationalization of the Cossack Pokrovas as symbols of Ukrainian 
identity. The first tendency is represented by the most recent work of Fedir Umantsev, the author 
of the 1966 essay on early modern Ukrainian art that includes a reproduction of the Pereiaslav 
Pokrova. In 2002 Umantsev published a general survey of medieval and early modern Ukrainian 
art in which he essentially repeated his previous assessments of Pokrova iconography and his 
earlier factual errors. He characterized the Pokrova icon with the portrait of Khmelnytsky as 
consonant with ideas expressed in Ukrainian dumy (epic songs) ‘that extol the events of the 
Pereiaslav Council.’ Sadly for the elderly scholar, there are no such dumy. In discussing the 
Pereiaslav Pokrova, Umantsev repeated his old errors whereby the church builder Colonel 
Myrovych was confused with Nemyrych, and Catherine I with Catherine II.
27         
  The scholarly standards of proponents of the complete nationalization of the Cossak 
Pokrovas would appear to be no higher. In an illustrated history released by the same Kyiv 
publisher that issued Umantsev’s book, the art historian and Orthodox activist Dmytro Stepovyk 
presents the Pokrova icons as the embodiment of Ukraine’s incessant struggle with its three 
                                                             
26 See, for example, the album of reproductions published for Western consumption in 1996 by Liudmyla 
Miliaieva. It includes three Cossack Pokrovas—those from Deshky (with the portrait of Bohdan 
Khmelnytsky), Sulymivka, and Novhorod-Siverskyi (see The Ukrainian Icon, text by Liudmila Miliayeva 
[Bournemouth and St. Petersburg, 1996]), 68-74. As in her earlier publications, Miliaieva avoids any 
comment on the ideological meaning of the icons, focusing instead on their characteristics as works of art. 
27 See F. S. Umantsev, Mystetstvo davn'oï Ukraïny. Istorychnyi narys (Kyiv, 2002), 242.   15 
oppressors: the Ottoman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Muscovy (later the 
Russian Empire). He also denies the possibility that Peter I is depicted in the Pokrova icon from 
Sulymivka (obviously confusing it with the one from Pereiaslav). Stepovyk writes that the 
Pokrova icons were meant to depict the Byzantine emperor and empress, not the Russian tsars. 
He goes on to reject the possibility of Peter I’s depiction on patriotic grounds, stating: ‘And what 
artist of sound mind would depict a bitter enemy of Ukraine, a despot and an insane maniac in a 
Ukrainian icon after what he did to Ukraine following the Battle of Poltava?’
28  
  If one compares the attention paid to the Cossack Pokrovas in the course of the twentieth 
century in terms of number of reproductions with the amount of actual research done on them in 
the same period, the result is quite disappointing. That research was minuscule indeed, especially 
as compared to the body of work done in neighbouring Poland and represented by Mieczysław 
Gębarowicz’s book on Pokrova iconography. The Pereiaslav Pokrova, associated in one way or 
another with the figures of Emperor Peter I and Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who are highly symbolic 
in modern national and social mythologies, exemplifies the difficult plight of art-historical 
research in modern Russia and Ukraine. It also focuses attention on the ideological and political 
currents that have influenced the interpretation of East European art over the last two centuries, 
including the rise of competing national projects that sought to ‘nationalize’ the artistic heritage 
of multinational empires and the advance of radical socialist doctrines that emphasized class 
struggle, striving to eradicate all manifestations of religious belief and its reflection in the fine 
arts. It appears that meticulous research into the rich legacy of the Cossack iconographers and the 
discovery of the multilayered significance of their work remains largely a task for the future. 
 
                                                             
28 See Dmytro Stepovyk, Istoriia ukraïns'koï ikony X-XX stolit' (Kyiv, 1996), 66. 